1. The Paradox of the Prisoner-Landlords
To understand the Baha'i presence in modern-day Israel, one must begin with its paradoxical origins in Ottoman Palestine. The official history starts with Baha’u’llah’s arrival in Acre in August 1868, not as a spiritual leader on a mission, but as a political prisoner of the Ottoman Empire. This image of religious persecution, however, is immediately complicated by the group's subsequent actions, which reveal a sharp and immediate focus on economic integration and strategic real estate acquisition.
In 1870, Baha’u’llah and his followers were released from the Acre Citadel, not as a gesture of clemency, but because the Turkish army needed more space. They remained prisoners, explicitly "forbidden to leave the city." Yet within this confinement, the sect’s administrative director and Baha’u’llah’s son, Abbas Effendi, immediately began forming connections with the local "upper class" and renting homes from local Muslims. This swift pivot from political confinement to calculated economic engagement raises a fundamental question. For a sect whose leader was still a state prisoner, this rapid integration into the local property market suggests that from the very outset, securing a physical and economic foothold was as important, if not more so, than any purely spiritual mission.
These initial forays into the Acre rental market were merely a prelude to the far more ambitious and large-scale land purchases that would soon define the Baha'i presence in Palestine.
2. Building a Real Estate Empire on Holy Ground
The period under Baha’u’llah’s leadership marked a strategic shift from renting properties within city walls to the aggressive acquisition of vast rural estates. This era represented the most intensive phase of land purchasing in the faith's history in Palestine, indicating a clear goal of establishing not just a spiritual presence, but a formidable physical and economic one. Moving far from the eyes of the authorities in Acre, the sect’s leaders began assembling a significant property portfolio through a savvy, multi-pronged strategy.
Their approach was multifaceted and cautious. For three estates east of Acre, including the significant Ridvan Park, they began by renting in 1875, only committing to a full purchase in 1881 after establishing a firm presence. In other areas like Junaynih, individual sect members made private purchases of 120 dunams, which were later transferred to the faith, obscuring the full scale of the sect's acquisitions. These holdings in the Zebulun Valley, which included approximately 550 dunams at Jidru, formed the initial core of their landed assets. But their ambition soon turned to a far larger prize in the Jordan Valley.
- Jordan Valley Holdings: A total of approximately 32,200 dunams were purchased across four sites:
- Nuqaib: ~13,000 dunams
- Samara: ~12,500 dunams
- Umm Juni: ~5,600 dunams
- Adassiya: ~1,100 dunams
The acquisition of such massive, undeveloped, and often dangerous tracts of land was not a simple act of settlement but a calculated political and economic maneuver. The Jordan Valley lands were neglected, subject to Bedouin raids, and likely acquired for an "attractively low" price. While Baha’u’llah’s personal longing for rural life is noted, the primary driver appears to have been strategic: he was "probably seeking to ensure the status and position of the sect." This was a move to secure tangible assets and build a foundation of power far from Ottoman oversight.
As the family accumulated these valuable assets, however, the land became not only a source of security but also the catalyst for the intense internal conflicts that would shape the faith's future.
3. Power, Property, and Family Feuds
The succession of leadership within the Baha'i faith was not a matter of seamless divine appointment but of intense power struggles, with control over the family's burgeoning property empire lying at the heart of the disputes. This was the inevitable outcome of a strategy that prioritized tangible assets over communal cohesion from the very beginning. When Baha’u’llah died in 1892, a struggle for leadership erupted between his sons, Abbas Effendi and Muhammad Ali Effendi, with Abbas ultimately emerging victorious. Decades later, a similar conflict would arise, this time with even higher stakes.
Following the death of Abbas Effendi, his appointed successor and grandson, Shoghi Effendi, faced a significant challenge to his authority from his own relatives over the ownership of the valuable Bahji estate—where Baha’u’llah himself was buried. The dispute escalated to a point where it required outside intervention.
The outcome of this family feud was decisive and revealing:
- The matter was brought before a British court, which ruled in favor of Shoghi Effendi, cementing his legal control over the contested property.
- Following this legal victory, Shoghi Effendi consolidated his power by having many of his opponents—whom he branded covenant-breakers—deported from Palestine.
Having secured absolute control over both the spiritual leadership and the physical properties of the faith, Shoghi Effendi would accelerate a major strategic shift in how the Baha'i leadership managed its vast land holdings.
4. From Acquisition to Liquidation
The early twentieth century saw a dramatic reversal in Baha'i land strategy. The era of aggressive acquisition gave way to a new policy of systematically selling off large portions of their holdings, particularly the undeveloped agricultural estates in the Jordan Valley, primarily to Jewish organizations.
This strategic pivot did not begin with Shoghi Effendi, but under his predecessor, Abbas Effendi. Facing persistent security threats from Bedouin raids and the economic reality of unimproved land worked by tenant farmers, the leadership began to liquidate these assets. Umm Juni and Samara were sold during the first decade of the twentieth century when Jewish organizations made "attractive offers." Shoghi Effendi later accelerated this process, selling off most of the remaining Jordan Valley lands. The very factors that made these lands an "attractively low" purchase for a marginalized sect—their undeveloped state and persistent insecurity—also made them a pragmatic and easily justifiable asset to liquidate when a more lucrative opportunity arose.
Amid this trend of selling land, one decision stands out as the exception that proves the rule. The settlement of Adassiya was the "first and only attempt by the Bahais to found a village of their own." This isolated effort underscores that the broader mission had fundamentally changed. The leadership was signaling a pivot away from agricultural settlement and toward a new, more centralized vision for its presence in Palestine. The capital generated from these land sales would be redirected toward a monumental new project: the construction of a global headquarters on Mount Carmel.
5. A World Center Without a Community?
The history of the Baha'i faith in Palestine culminates in a central, lingering question: After decades spent acquiring land, fighting over its control, and eventually selling it for development funds, why did the local Baha'i community itself fail to grow? Idit Luzia (author of the article related to the Baha'i faith in the book The Land that became Israel : studies in historical geography) is explicit that the community's size "never exceeded several hundred members." This demographic stagnation stands in stark contrast to the grandeur of the physical structures the leadership erected.
The reasons provided for this lack of growth are a mixture of external pressures and, most notably, internal policy:
- External historical events not directly related to the sect
- A hostile administration, particularly under the Ottomans
- Internal struggles and power feuds within the sect
- A leadership that "consciously limited demographic development"
This final point is the most revealing. Why would a religious leadership, in its own holy land, deliberately limit the growth of its own community? This policy confirms that the ultimate goal was never to cultivate a thriving, populous local spiritual community. Instead, the entire strategy—from the initial land grab in Acre to the liquidation of the Jordan Valley estates—was aimed at the creation of a global, corporate-style headquarters. The Baha'i World Center was built for a worldwide following, funded by international donations and the strategic sale of its Palestinian land assets, leaving a legacy of magnificent buildings without a significant local community to inhabit them.
(Much of the material presented here is derived from the book The Land that became Israel : studies in historical geography by Ruth Kark - 1990)
